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A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPORTS LABOR STOPPAGES:
THE ISSUES, THE LABOR STOPPAGES AND
THEIR EFFECTIVENESS (OR LACK THEREOF)
Genevieve F.E. Birren*
INTRODUCTION
Since the formation of the first players' union, both the unions and
management have used a variety of strategies when dealing with one
another. Labor stoppages have been used by both sides and the conse-
quences of those approaches have been equally varied. The 1994 base-
ball strike that cancelled the World Series, the shortened National
Basketball Association (NBA) season due to lock-out, and the entire
2004-2005 National Hockey League (NHL) season that was cancelled
due to a lock-out are three of the more extreme and public examples
of labor disputes in professional sports.
Patterns of behavior have appeared in labor relations in profes-
sional sports. The most known and extensive were the labor stoppages
that occurred in Major League Baseball (MLB) after the expiration of
every collective bargaining agreement (CBA) prior to 2002. Why la-
bor stoppages and other issues repeatedly occur are questions that
have no definitive answer, or, perhaps, just no solution. However,
whether these stoppages have been effective is one that may be
answerable.
Effectiveness
What does it mean to be effective? The Merriam-Webster diction-
ary defines effective as "producing a decided, decisive, or desired ef-
fect."' The Business Dictionary defines it as "[T]he degree to which
objectives are achieved and extent to which targeted problems are
solved." 2
* Assistant Professor at SUNY Cortland; Ph. D. candidate, University of New Mexico; M.S.
2006, New York University; J.D. 2004, Marquette University Law School; B.A. 2001, University
of Wisconsin-Madison.
1. MELRRIAM-WEBSTER, located at http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionaryleffective (last
accessed Sept. 4, 2013).
2. BUSINEss DICTIONARY, located at http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/effective-
ness.html (last accessed Sept. 4, 2013).
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At the most fundamental level, all of the work stoppages in sport
have been effective as they have eventually led to a new CBA and a
resumption of games and league operations. However, such a view of
labor stoppages, as stand-alone events, is short-sighted and does not
look at the broader history.
Money is the most common criteria that is used to measure a sport's
effectiveness-how much money are the players getting paid overall,
how large are their salaries, how much revenue does the league bring
in, etc. Based on salary, it appears that the National Basketball Play-
ers Association (NBPA) is the most effective union with the average
player salary over $5 million a year.3 The National Football League
Players Association (NFLPA) would appear to be the least effective
under this comparison, as the average National Football League
(NFL) player makes less then $2 million per year.4 However, this
comparison is unreasonable since and NBA team has 15 players and
an NFL has 54.
The NFL could easily be viewed as the most effective league, as it
brings in the largest amount of revenue, $9.5 billion in 2012.5 Of the
four being examined in this study, the league with the next highest
revenue is MLB, with $6.36 in 2012.6 However, given the huge dispar-
ity in the number of games, total season attendance, and sponsorship
and media deals, league revenue is also not the best measure of
effectiveness.
Financial concerns are generally the primary issues involved in a
labor stoppage, so instead of examining the exact numbers of each
league, this study is instead concerned with whether labor stoppages
led to resolutions of the problems that caused the stoppage. Specifi-
cally, do labor stoppages provide long-term issue resolution?
PRIOR RESEARCH
There are no studies or papers that examine the effectiveness of the
various labor stoppages on issue resolution. There are numerous arti-
3. Big Money: USA Today Examines NBA Team Payrolls For '06-08, SPORTS Bus. DAILY,
March 29, 2007, located at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=article.
main&articleld=110730&keyword=average%20salary.
4. The Tagliabue Era: Players See Salary Growth Since '89, SPORTS Bus. DAILY, August 1,
2006, located at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=article.main&
articleld= 104662&keyword=average%20salary
5. Daniel Kaplan, The Road to $25 Billion, SPORTBUSINESsDAILY, January 28,2013, located at
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2013/01/28/In-Depth/NFL-revenue-streams.
aspx
6. Mike Ozanian, The Business of Baseball 2012, FORBES, March 21, 2012, located at http://
www.forbes.com/sites/mikeozanian/2012/03/21/the-business-of-baseball-2012/
[Vol. 10:1
2014]A BRIEF HISTORY OF SPORTS LABOR STOPPAGES 3
cles that discuss specific labor stoppages and their outcomes or ex-
amine the labor history of a particular sport7 , but none that look at the
larger body of labor stoppages in American professional sport. Using
studies involving non-sports labor stoppages to draw conclusions
about sports unions is unreasonable, because the activities of non-
sports unions and management are seldom as public as those of sports;
their employees are not as highly-paid, as famous, or considered pub-
lic role models. This puts sports in a unique position from other un-
ions and they cannot be compared.8 Sports labor stoppages and their
effectiveness have to be compared to each other.
The scope of this article is limited to the major four sports leagues
and their respective unions. These unions have a far longer history
than other sports unions and they have dealt with a wide array of is-
sues and tried many different tactics, thus providing a diverse group.
First, the labor history of each of these sports, then they will be ex-
amined for effectiveness. The final section discusses what other sports'
unions can learn from the big four's experiences.
THE HISTORY OF LABOR STOPPAGES BY SPORT
MLB/MLBPA History
There is little question that baseball has the most documented and
contentious labor history. 9 Prior to the 2002 CBA, baseball had a la-
bor stoppage during every CBA negotiation except the first. The 2002-
2006 CBA was the first negotiated in over 30 years without a labor
stoppage. The 2007-2011 and 2012-2016 CBAs were also reached with-
out any stoppage. Whether this is a new trend in labor relations in
professional baseball remains to be seen, but it is a significant depar-
ture from the contentious 35 years prior.
7. Kevin Quinn, Getting to the 2011-2020 National Football League Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 7 INT. J. SPORT FIN. 141 (2012); Arne Biischemann & Christian Deutscher, Did the
2005 Collective Bargaining Agreement Really Improve Team Efficiency in the NHL?, 6 INr. J.
SPORT FIN. 298 (2011); Nathaniel Grow, Decertifying Players Unions: Lessons from the NFL and
NBA Lockouts of 2011, 15 VAND. J. Er. & TECH. L. 473 (2013); Dan Messeloff, The NBA's
Deal with the Devil: The Antitrust Implications of the 1999 NBA-NBPA Collective Bargaining
Agreement, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENr. L.J. 521 (2000); L.M. Debrock & A.E.
Roth, Strike 2 - Labor Management Negotiations in Major League Baseball, 12 BELL J. ECON.
413 (1981).
8. Grant M. Hayden, Some Keys to the NBA Lockout, 16 HoFSTRA LAB. & Emp. L.J. 453,
461-463 (1999).
9. For a detailed account of the history of labor relations in professional baseball, see, James
R. Devine, The Legacy of Albert Spalding, the Holdouts of Ty Cobb, Joe DiMaggio, and Sandy
Koufax/Don Drysdale, and the 1994-1995 Baseball Strike: Baseball's Labor Disputes are as Lin-
ear as the Game, 31 AKRON L. REV. 1 (1997) and MARVIN MILLER, A Wiioou DIITEREEr BALL
GAME; THE7 INSIDE STORY OF BASIBALL'S NFw DEAL (Fireside 1991).
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The first CBA in baseball was in 1968 and was a two year agree-
ment. As the first CBA in professional sports, it was a novelty and
both sides were treading in unfamiliar waters. There was no work
stoppage during this initial negotiation, the only time this would hap-
pen for the next 34 years.
Several issues were the focus of this CBA. The original focus of the
MLBPA was to increase the players' minimum salary from $6,000.00
per year to $12,000.00 per year10 and eliminate the reserve system,
although the MLBPA did not expect to achieve very much on the lat-
ter issue." The final agreement included the first-ever Uniform
Player's Contract and a formal grievance procedure, as well as an in-
crease in the minimum salary, although not for full amount. 12
Although the CBA was for two years, labor peace would not last
that long in professional baseball. In 1966 the players and owners
signed a three year agreement regarding only player pensions and in-
surance which was separate from the CBA.'3 When the benefit plan
came up for renegotiation, the owners were not cooperating, so the
players voluntarily agreed not to sign their contracts for the up-com-
ing season.'4 This worked and a new three-year benefit plan was
agreed to in early 1970 without an interruption to the baseball
season.' 5
The 1972 CBA negotiation and strike was the unmistakable point of
baseball's deteriorating labor relations. The only issue up for negotia-
tion in 1972 was the benefit plan. The players wanted a $500,000 per
year increase in the owners' contribution toward health insurance, to
which the owners initially agreed.16 What the owners refused to agree
to was an increase retirement benefits at the same rate as cost of living
benefits.'7 Later, the owners also lowered their offer on their health
insurance contribution.' 8
Negotiations failed to progress and throughout a series of meetings
with the teams, the players took a preliminary vote of 663-10 in favor
of a striking if necessary.19 A final vote of 47-0 of the team representa-
10. MILLER, supra note 9, at 95.
11. Id. at 98.
12. Id. at 97.
13. Id. at 95, 98.
14. Id. at 99-104.
15. MILLER, supra note 9, at 105.
16. Id. at 203-204.
17. Id. 203-205.
18. Id. at 204.
19. Id. at 209.
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tives made the strike official. 20 The strike, the first in professional
sports, lasted only thirteen days, resulted in the cancellation of 86
games and ultimately gained the owners agreement to both of the
players requests.21 The 1973 CBA came quietly after the strike. The
players' won the right to impartial salary arbitration, 22 which was an
improvement from just having impartial grievance arbitration in the
1970 CBA.
The next CBA negotiation was in 1976, which resulted in the first
lock-out in professional sports. The major issue was free-agency. 23 The
players had won free-agency after one year through arbitration, a de-
cision the owners tried to ignore and something that even MLBPA
management agreed was not the best scenario.24 The owners' response
was to offer the following free agency proposal:
... [I]n order for a player to be eligible for free agency he would
have to be in the majors for nine years. If no agreement could be
reached after an additional year (his tenth season - the option
year), that player would become a free agent, unless the club of-
fered him a contract of $30,000 or more. The $30,000 would apply to
all players, including superstars, and would remain unchanged over
the next four years. In addition, the club that acquired the free
agent would have to pay a large cash settlement to the departing
player's team.25
The MLBPA refused this offer and a stalemate began. The owners
ended up locking the players out of spring training for seventeen days,
although the negotiations took longer.26 A final agreement was
reached four months later, granting players free agency after six years,
the right to demand a trade after five years, and the right to designate
up to six teams they did not want to be traded to.2 7 The owners were
not happy with the agreement and labor relations between MLB and
the MLBPA deteriorated over the course of the agreement.28
In 1980 the CBA was again up for renegotiation. Free agency was
the primary issue: the owners wanted it ended, claiming that it was the
cause of teams losing money due to high salaries and a loss of compet-
itive balance. 29 The union refused, and combined with the already de-
20. MILLER, supra note 9, at 212.
21. Id. at 221-222.
22. Id. at 109.
23. Id. at 255.
24. Id. at 254-258.
25. MILLER, supra note 9, at 256.
26. Id. at 264.
27. Id. at 267.
28. Id. at 275-285.
29. Id. at 287-288.
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teriorating labor relations that had developed over the previous four
years, there was an immediate standstill. No agreement was reached,
but there did appear to progress for awhile, so baseball continued with
no CBA in place. However, nothing was accomplished and the owners
declared an impasse and implemented their last offer.30 The result is
that the players struck.
The strike lasted 50 days and the union was the victor. The settle-
ment resulted in the creation of the player pool and no team compen-
sation for free agents. 31 Because the CBA took so long to negotiate
and the strike had damaged the season, the players did agree to ex-
tend the agreement and benefit plan through 1984, a year longer than
originally intended. 32
The 1985 CBA resulted in the first failure by the MLBPA. Salary
arbitration eligibility was increased from two years of service to three
and the union agreed to less then one-third of national broadcast reve-
nue for the pension plan for the first time ever.33 There was a walkout,
but it lacked player support and lasted only two days. 34
Following the 1985 negotiations, the owners instituted collusion. Al-
though the players had some free agency, it was rendered useless be-
cause the owners agreed among themselves not to bid on each other's
free agents. The result was that although a player had the right to go
another team and offer his services, there were no takers. Only one
player switched teams due to his free agency during this time. This
lasted through at least 1988.35
Free agency became the main issue of contention during the 1990
CBA negotiations, although a number of other issues were brought up
as well; salary caps, revenue sharing, salary arbitration and pay-for-
performance. 36 The final CBA did not include a salary cap, greater
limitations on free agency or revenue sharing, although did include a
compromise on salary arbitration. 37 During the negotiation, the own-
ers locked the players out of spring training for 32 days.
Four years later came the longest work stoppage in baseball history,
and at the time in professional sports. The 1994-1995 strike lasted 232
days and resulted in the cancellation of the World Series. The primary
issues were a salary cap of fifty percent of the national broadcast deal,
30. MILLER, supra note 9, at 292.
31. Id. at 317.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 338-339.
34. Id. at 337.
35. MILLER, supra note 9, at 351.
36. Id. at 353, 356.
37. Id. at 359.
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the length of service before free agency eligibility (the owners wanted
it lowered from six years to four) and salary arbitration.38 The union
refused to have a salary cap and the result was a strike.39 Although the
labor stoppage was ended to allow the 1995 season to progress, the
new CBA, a six-year agreement was not signed until 1996.
In 2002 the CBA expired and it appeared that there would be a
ninth work stoppage in as many negotiations. However, hours before
the walk-out deadline, a deal was reached in a four-year CBA.40 The
main issues were revenue sharing and the luxury tax.41
The players wanted no luxury tax in the final year of the deal - they
did not get it.42 There was a fairly even compromise on the revenue
sharing, with the players wanting a four-year phase-in of revenue shar-
ing with full sharing the fourth year only and the owners wanted no
phase-in with full sharing in all years.43 The result was a partial phase-
in and the last two years at full revenue sharing. 44
The 2002 CBA negotiations were the first time the MLB and the
MLBPA actually compromised and did not stick to their respective
win-at-all-costs mentality. This appears to have become a pattern
since the 2007 and 2012 CBAs were also achieved without a labor
stoppage.45 This CBA was also noted by commentators as not having
any "revolutionary" changes to it and it was basically a continuation
of the previous agreement.46 There were minor changes to agreement
in the minimum salary, the free agency date, the competitive balance
tax and revenue sharing funds.47 No changes were significant and no
new features were added to these topics.
38. DEVINE, supra note 9, at 59-60.
39. Id. at 60-61.
40. Murray Chass, Last Minute Deal in Baseball Talk s Prevents a Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Aug, 31,
2002, Al.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. SBD/SBJ Top Ten: Sports Business Stories Of The Year: A New Day For MLB: CBA
Reached in Unprecedented Fashion, SPORrs Bus. DAILY, December 19, 2006, located at http://
www.sportsbusinessdaily.comlindex.cfm?fuseaction=article.main&articleld=108210&keyword=
MLBPA.
46. Id.; MLB Labor Deal Includes Changes to Tax Rate, Minimum Salary, SPORTs Bus.
DAILY, October 26, 2006, located at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/index.cfm?fuse
action=article.main&articleld=106867&keyword=MLBPA.
47. MLB Labor Deal, supra note 46.
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NBA/NBPA History
Prior to 1998, the NBA was the only sport to not lose a regular
season game to a labor dispute, having had only one prior significant
labor stoppage 48 - a three month lockout during the 1995 pre-sea-
son.49 This lockout, although not disruptive to the regular season, was
important to the future labor relations between the NBA and the
NBPA.
The NBPA, in 1983, was the first of the major professional sports
unions to agree to some type of salary cap and revenue sharing
scheme.50 After eleven years of labor peace, the CBA expired in June
of 1994.51 In October of 1994 both sides made a no-lockout, no-strike
agreement that allowed the 1994-1995 seasons to conclude uninter-
rupted, and was later extended through June of 1995.52
A deal was announced in late June of 1995 but the players refused
to ratify it.53 Some players even explored decertifying the union.54 The
owners locked-out the players and the union agreed to decertify if a
deal was not struck by August 8th, 1995.55 On the August 8th a tenta-
tive deal was announced and the players subsequently voted not do
decertify the union and voted to approve the six year CBA in
September.56
In 1998, less then three full years into the six year CBA agreed to in
1995, the owners decided to exercise their right to reopen the CBA at
the end of the season.57 Negotiations failed and on July 1st the owners
locked-out the players.58 The lockout lasted six months and five days,
causing the 1998-1999 season to be shortened by several months.59
Only one issue was the cause of the reopening of the CBA and the
lockout - the salary cap. The owners wanted to further limit salary
48. On July 10, 1996 there was an additional lockout that lasted a matter of hours.
49. C. Peter Goplerud III, Symposium Article: Collective Bargaining on the National Football
League: A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & ENr. L.J. 13 (1997).
50. NBA Labor Chronology, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 13, 1995, Sports, pg. 43.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id
54. Id.
55. NBA Labor Chronology, supra note 50.
56. Id; see also; Key Dates in NBA Labor Battle, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, September 13, 1995,
Sports, pg. 125.
57. Key Dates, supra note 51.
58. Id.
59. Id.
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increases and the players did not.60 Eventually the owners did get an
amendment to the CBA with a stricter salary cap.61
In 2005, the NBA and NBPA came to the precipice of another labor
stoppage. They managed to agree to a new deal before the owners
instituted another lockout.62 The primary issues were the same as pre-
vious years - the salary cap and free agency. The cap ultimately went
up and maximum contract lengths were reduced to six years, which
means that players are free agents sooner.63 Drug testing was also at
issue and a testing regime was agreed to, which was probably the re-
sult of MLB's steroids scandal.6" A minimum age limit was also estab-
lished, which was most likely instigated by the Maurice Claret case
against the NFL.6 5
Many people feel that the NBA and NBPA came to an agreement
without a labor stoppage because of the situation that was occurring at
the same time with the NHL.6 6 Although NBPA Executive Director
Billy Hunter stated that hockey's situation would have no impact on
their [the NBPA] negotiations, it was difficult to believe that this was
true, given that Mr. Hunter also stated that he did not see any reason
why the union would agree to an age limit, which they did.67
The expiration of the 2005 CBA in 2011 led to another labor stop-
page in the NBA, again a lockout. The primary issues of contention in
this lockout involved the owner/player split of basketball related in-
come (BRI), a hard salary cap, reduced compensation, and the elimi-
nation of guaranteed contracts.68 These issues were resolved with a
reduced player share of BRI from 57% to 49-51%, an increase in the
luxury tax penalty for going over the soft cap, an increase in the salary
floor from 75% of the cap to 85-90%, and a reduction of the maxi-
mum length of contract from 6/5 years to 5/4 years.69 This lockout
60. Id.
61. Murray Chass, On Pro Basketball: In Final Staredown, Players Take the Hit, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 1999, D5.
62. David Steele, Dark NHL Helps NBA see the Light, BALTIMORE SUN, June 20, 2005, 1D.
63. NBA gets Deal, Avoids Lockout, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 22, 2005, 1C.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. STEEL, supra note 62.
67. Billy Hunter stated this is response to a question presented to him during a panel discus-
sion at the World Congress of Sports in New York City in March of 2005. The author of this
article was present at that panel discussion.
68. Kevin Carpenter, NFL and NBA Lockouts: A U.K. Lawyer's Legal Retrospective, 20
SPORTs.LAw.J. 1 (2013).
69. Id.
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lasted 149 days reduced the 2011-2012 season to 66 games, from the
usual 82.70 The resulting CBA lasts through 2021.
NFL/NFLPA History
The labor relations between the NFL and NFLPA have a long and
contentious history, involving methods taken by no other professional
sports union. The relations between the NFL and the NFLPA, al-
though at some points very similar to the labor relations in baseball,
differ in one very important way: the NFL is subject to the antitrust
laws.71 The result of this is that the players in the NFL have the courts
as recourse for their grievances, which professional baseball players
have never really had due to the baseball antitrust exemption.72 This
ability to sue in court is the main element that results in the very dif-
ferent methods used by the NFLPA and the MLBPA and their
successes.
The first CBA was signed in 1968. There was a brief labor stoppage
during training camp over pension contributions, but it did not last
long and the CBA was agreed ratified.73 In 1970 there was seventeen
day lockout by the owners followed by a two day strike by the play-
ers.7 4 The primary issues were compensation, the reserve system and
grievance procedures, although a number of other issues were ad-
dressed in the CBA. The final agreement was four years and included
a raise in the minimum salary, increased pensions and health cover-
age, impartial grievance arbitration, player representation on the Re-
tirement Board and the right to use agents.75 However, there was no
change in the reserve system.
The 1974 negotiations marked the first major labor relations con-
flict in professional football. There were a number of issues of impor-
tance to the players. These included: "[e]limination of the option
clause and Rozelle Rule, which limited free agency; [i]mpartial arbi-
tration of all disputes; [e]limination of the draft; [e]limination of the
70. Howard Beck, N.B.A. Reaches a Tentative Deal to Save the Season, N.Y. TIMES, Novem-
ber 26, 2011, located at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/27/sports/basketball/nba-and-basketball-
players-reach-deal-to-end-lockout.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
71. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§141-187 (2006).
72. Federal Base Ball Club of Baltimore, Inc. c Nat'l. League of Prof. Base Ball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922).
73. C. Peter Goplerud III, Symposium Article: Collective Bargaining on the National Football
League: A Historical and Comparative Analysis, 4 VILL. SPORTS & Er. L.J. 13 (1997)
74. NFLPA Website, located at http://www.nflpa.org/.
75. Id.
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waiver system; [a] new, individual contract to protect players, includ-
ing guaranteed payment of salaries." 76
The Rozelle Rule involved an automatic one-year option clause in
the Standard Player Contract that permitted the owner to option their
own players for one year at 90% their previous salary. The result was
that players were coerced to sign new contracts and get paid more
money then work under the option and get less. Furthermore, Com-
missioner Rozelle required that in order to play on an NFL team,
every player must sign the Standard Player Agreement containing this
clause. The result was that there was not free agency.
The owners refused to bargain and the players went on strike, which
lasted 41 days.77 At that point the players realized that the owners
were not going to bargain, called off the strike, and filed antitrust and
labor lawsuits.78
The NFLPA won these lawsuits and a new CBA was signed in 1977
after three years of working without one.79 Although the players did
not win all of their demands, they won some, most importantly the
elimination of the Rozelle Rule, as well as increased benefits, impar-
tial arbitration of non-injury grievances, and reforms to the waiver
system and the option clause.s0
However, free agency was not a success because the owners did not
bid on free agents for a number of reasons. The price - a first-round
draft pick - was too high for most free agents and the revenue sharing
that the owners had instituted themselves meant that they made a
profit whether their team was successful on the field or not, so there
was little incentive to bid on players.' So when the CBA ended in
1981, the NFLPA tried a different approach.
In 1982 the NFLPA suggested that there be a salary cap of 55% of
league-wide revenues and that player salaries would be determined by
team and player performance, years of service and playing time, not
on when the player was drafted.82 The owners summarily rejected this,
claiming they did not want the players as a partner, so the players
struck and the owners responded by locking them out of team proper-
ties.83 This stalemate lasted two months before a new agreement was
reached.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. NFLPA WEBSifE, supra note 74.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
12 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. [Vol. 10:1
The agreement was the result of the realization that with failure the
entire season would be cancelled and because the owners finally
agreed to a significantly increased salary and benefit package that
amounted to over 50% of league revenue.84 The players ultimately got
most of what they were looking for, albeit not in the terms they
wanted, along with expanded medical rights, other monetary benefits
and the owners' agreement that they would not negotiate with any
agent not certified by the NFLPA.85
Up to this point the NFLPA had had success, but had not gotten
everything they wanted and some of the agreements had not worked
as the players though they would. In 1987 free agency was the single
most important issue to the players. Previous restricted free agency
schemes had produced virtually no player movement, and were clearly
not working as the players wanted.8 6 Again the owners rejected the
players' demands and again the players struck.87
This time the owners decided to use replacement players instead of
allowing games to go unplayed.88 It became apparent that the strike
was not going to work and was called-off after only a month.89 In-
stead, the NFLPA filed an antitrust suit, which they won at the Dis-
trict Court level.90 The owners appealed and won in the Eighth
Circuit, with the court stating that so long as the union represented
the players, they had no standing to sue under the antitrust laws. 91 So
on December 5th, 1989 the players did something never done before
in professional sports - they decertified their union.92
The NFLPA became a professional association, specifically prohib-
ited from collective bargaining, but with the purpose to represent the
players in their lawsuits against the NFL.93 In the spring of 1990 the
NFLPA filed the McNeil case.94 Over two years later the case went to
trial and after fifty days of trial proceedings and two days of delibera-
tion, the jury came back in favor of the players.95 This did not win free
agency, just prohibited a specific restriction by the owners. However a
number of other cases were won by the NFLPA and others were filed
84. NFLPA WEBSm7, supra note 74.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. NFLPA WEBSITE, supra note 74.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. NFLPA WEBSITE, supra note 74.
95. Id.
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and the NFL began to get concerned over the financial costs. 9 6 In No-
vember of 1992 settlement talks began.
The owners wanted a salary cap, which ironically the players had
essentially offered and the owners had rejected ten years earlier.97
The players wanted free agency.98 So they compromised; free agency
in exchange for a salary cap.99 The cap was 64% of league revenue,
with a minimum of 58% and the last year of the CBA was an uncap-
ped year.100 Case settlement costs were also paid by the NFL.10
In March of 1993 the players voted to recertify their union, after
functioning for over three years with no union.10 2 For the first time in
almost six years an official CBA was then negotiated, which incorpo-
rated the settlement as well as many other issues.103 The other impor-
tant feature of the 1993 CBA was that along with the last year being
uncapped, that year also extends free agency eligibility from four
years to six.104 This provides both the NFL and the NFLPA with an
incentive to renegotiate the CBA before the last year is reached. The
players are hurt by the restriction on free agency and the owners are
at financial risk because without a cap, huge bidding wars could break
out over the available players. Both sides did not want these things to
happen, so it was believed that both had sufficient incentive to return
to the negotiating table and make a new deal prior to the expiration.
That worked for awhile, but failed to do so in 2011.
1993-2011: Those eighteen years of continuous labor peace in foot-
ball had been the longest in professional sports. However, when the
CBA expired in 2011, the NFL locked the players out, a lockout that
lasted 132 days, and one pre-season game, the Hall of Fame game was
cancelled as a result.105 The NFLPA decertified the union as it had
done in 1989 and the players filed an antitrust action in federal
court.10 6 The lockout was resolved before the court had to rule on the
merits of the claim and the case was dismissed when the new agree-
ment was reached, in addition to the re-certification of the NFLPA.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. NFLPA WEBSITE, supra note 74.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. NFLPA WEBSITE, supra note 74.
105. CARPENTER, supra note 68.
106. Brady v. Nat'l Football League, 644 F.3d 661 (8th Cir. 2011).
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The main issues in this dispute were revenue sharing between the
players and owners, free agency, the salary cap (and floor), and con-
tract lengths. 07 Under the new agreement, the players' portion of
shared revenue dropped from 50% to 47%. The salary cap was in-
creased to $120m, increasing 10-12% each subsequent year, with a
floor of 89%. Minimum contract lengths were reduced for drafted
rookies, but instituted for the first time for undrafted rookies. 08 Addi-
tionally, a rookie pay scale was established. 109
NHL/NHLPA History
The labor relations in hockey have been the least written about and
documented of the four major professional sports leagues. This ap-
pears to be due to the fact that, prior to the 1990s, there was no real
arms length bargaining between the NHLPA and the NHL. The Exec-
utive Director of the NHLPA from 1967 to 1991 was Alan Eagleson.
During his time as Executive Director, he was well liked by the play-
ers, management, and the press. Eagleson maintained labor peace and
collective bargaining was merely a formality, and for years people
thought that he was doing an excellent job. In 1989 allegations
emerged that Eagleson had conspired with NHL executives to sup-
press player salaries, embezzled from the NHLPA and generally failed
to represent the interests of the players.110
The players filed civil lawsuits against him and both the United
States and Canada filed criminal charges against him. Some players
won their suits, others did not. He was charged by the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police for fraud. 1 ' He was indicted in Massachusetts on
thirty-four charges of racketeering, fraud and embezzlement.112 After
four years of avoiding United States jurisdiction by remaining in Ca-
nada, he pled guilty in January of 1998 in Boston.1' 3
The result of this is that for almost twenty-five years the players in
the NHL were not adequately represented. No labor disputes oc-
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Mike Jones & Mark Maske, NFL Rookies Signing Contracts Rapidly under New Salary
System, Washington Post, May 16, 2012, located at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/foot-
ball-insider/post/rookies-signing-contracts-rapidly-under-new-salary-cap-system/2012/05/16/glQ
AfSQMUU-blog.html
110. Mary Ormsby, Ex-NHL Head Cited in Lawsuit; Trio Conspired to Restrict Salaries, Play-
ers Allege, TORONTo STAR, November 9, 1995, at B1.
111. Mike Ganter, How Right Won the Fight: Alan Eagleson Survived many Battles, but in
1989 a War began he could not Win: Eagle Guilty, TiE TORONTO SUN, January 8, 1998, Sports
pg.7.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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curred because there was not a genuine adversarial relationship. The
players were kept relatively uninformed about labor issues, including
the salaries of other hockey players. After Bob Goodenow became
Executive Director, the players became more informed and labor dis-
putes arose.114
In the 21 years since Eagleson left the NHLPA there have been four
labor stoppages. The first was in 1992 and lasted 10 days during the
Stanley Cup playoffs. 115 The players stopped the strike but no agree-
ment was reached.
Two years later there was still no new CBA since the expiration of
the previous one in September of 1992. In October of 1994, Gary
Bettman locked the players out and postponed the start of the 1994
season.116
The issues during both labor stoppages were the same since it was
the same dispute. Player salaries had doubled since 1992 and the own-
ers wanted some kind of salary cap or luxury tax to try to control
salaries.117 Players also wanted a change to the salary arbitration sys-
tem, making it more like MLB's, and increased free agency.s18 There
were also revenue sharing issues.119 Hockey managed to survive this
tumultuous time and prospered over the next nine years - then the
longest work stoppage in the history of professional sports occurred.
In 2004 the NHL became the first professional sports league to lose
an entire season to a labor dispute. The owners again locked out the
players, this time for 310 days. 12 0 The primary focus of the dispute was
financial, with several teams claiming that they were losing millions of
dollars each season. Player salaries had continued to rise, the league
had lost its basic television deal and its deal with ESPN was precarious
at best and not very lucrative. The result is that the owners wanted a
salary cap and the players did not. The owners also explored revenue
sharing options, which they ultimately agreed to.12 1
The final result has been heralded as a complete victory for the
owners. Existing contracts were slashed by 24% (something initially
114. Sports Union Conflicts; Labor Wars, HousTON CHRONICLE, Oct.23, 1994, § 2, at 25.
115. Bob McKenzie, Buying Time for a Face Off Owners, Players have until Oct. 15, To-
RONrro STAR, Oct. 27, 1994, at 1A.
116. Sports Unions Conflicts, supra note 114.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Helene Elliott, New Game for the NHL: Bettman Declares an end to the 310-day Lockout,
but Rule Changes Figure to make the Biggest Splash when the League Resumes in October, Los
ANGELES TIMES, July 23, 2005, D1.
121. Id.
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proposed by the players); a hard rookie salary cap was instituted, as
well as a hard team cap, although with in a revenue sharing plan that
allots the players a certain percentage of league revenue.122 All bo-
nuses counted against the salary cap and free agents who were not
signed by December 1st of a given year could not play that season,
which was an attempt to end player holdouts.123
When the 2005 agreement expired in 2012 the NHL again locked
the players out. This lockout lasted 119 days and reduced the 2012-
2013 from the customary 82 games to 48 games per team.124 The pri-
mary items at issues were revenue sharing, contract lengths, signing
bonuses and salary payments, and free agency.125 The final agreement,
set to expire in 2023, reduced the players' share of revenue from 57%
to 50% and will use this number to determine the salary cap, with the
midpoint based on the shared revenue and the cap 15% higher than
the midpoint and the floor 15% lower (for 2013-2014 these numbers
are $44m, $54.15, and $64.3).126 Contract lengths were capped at sever
years (eight if a team was re-signing its own player).127 Additionally
salary arbitration awards under $3.5 million require mandatory
acceptance. 128
COMPARISON OF LABOR STOPPAGES
The following chart shows how many of each type of stoppage
(lockout or strike) occurred in each sport.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Doug Kyed, NHL Lockout Officially Over as League, Players Sign Memorandum of Un-
derstanding, NESN, January 12, 2013, located at http://nesn.com/2013/01/report-nhl-lockout-offi-
cially-over-as-league-players-sign-memorandum-of-understanding/
125. Sources: NHL makes First CBA Offer, ESPN.com, July 14, 2012, located at http://espn.go.
com/nhl/story/_/ id/8166038/nhl-first-cba-offer-nhlpa-reportedly-features-big-givebacks
126. NHL/NHLPA PROPOSED CBA - SUMMARY OF TERMS, January 12,2013, located at http:/
/www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/CBA2012/NHLNHLPA-ProposedCBA_-_SummaryfoLTerms
FINAL_-_Jan._12,_2013%20(1).pdf
127. Id.
128. Id.
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TABLE 1
Labor Stoppages by Sport
League Lockout Strike CBAs % of CBAs w/stoppage
MLB 3 5 11 72.73
NBA 3129 0 7 42.86
NFL 2 4130 9131 66.67
NHL 3 1 4132 100
There have been a total of 21 labor stoppages in the history of these
four professional sports leagues. 11 have been lockouts and 10 have
been strikes.
The NBPA has been the least likely of all the parties to instigate a
labor stoppage. All of the labor stoppages in professional basketball
have been lockouts -the players have never gone out on strike. Each
of the 264 days lost to labor stoppages have been instigated by the
league, not the union. Depending on one's view, the NBPA is either
the union least willing to use hard labor tactics and is thus the weak-
est, or it is the most willing to continue working through labor
disputes.
The NHL has the highest stoppage rate at 100%, but this actually
seems reasonable. After three decades under Alan Eagleson, the
union was very weak and the NHL was accustomed to having its way.
The only way that the NHLPA was going to assert itself was using
harder tactics. However, the union has only struck once, for 10 days,
the first of the labor stoppages. All subsequent labor stoppages have
been lockouts by the owners, resulting in approximately 530 days or
1.45 years worth of lockout days.
Baseball has the next highest labor stoppage rate, but given the long
history of genuine bargaining, this is much less understandable. The
players have struck five times and the owners have locked out the
players three times, so both sides are responsible for interruptions in
baseball.
What is surprising about the repeated labors stoppages in profes-
sional baseball is that neither side appears to learn from the previous
129. There was a fourth lockout in 1996 over $50 million of television revenue, but it only
lasted a couple hours and was not a result of a CBA dispute, so it is not included here.
130. In 1968 the owners locked the players out so they struck in return. So there have been
only five labor stoppages, time-wise.
131. This includes all.
132. Since there was not actual arms-length negotiating between the NHL and NHLPA during
Alan Eagleson's tenure, these CBAs are not included because they are not representative of true
collective bargaining.
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stoppages. For the union this may be because often they won most to
everything that they were demanding, so stoppages were effective for
them and compromising was perhaps viewed as a failure. The follow-
ing quotes are evidence of the professional baseball's unwillingness to
consider the history of their labor relations when involved with new
negotiations.
"Through history, how many people have learned by their mis-
takes? If people learned by their mistakes, there would be no more
wars. But most people don't like history. In our schools, history isn't
a popular subject."' 33
-Dusty Baker, Giants manager
"If history repeats itself, we'll go on strike."1 34
-Eric Chavez, A's 3rd baseman
However, baseball currently has the longest streak of labor peace,
at eighteen years, and has negotiated three consecutive CBAs without
a labor stoppage, so perhaps baseball has learned from its past.
An NFLPA strike has been the cause of a labor stoppage in 66.67%
of all NFL labor disputes. However, there has been no strike by the
NFLPA since 1987 and only one labor stoppage since then.
What this shows us that both sides have been responsible for labor
stoppages. When time is taken into consideration however, we see
that the recent labor stoppages have been instigated by the owners,
not the players. The last player strike was in 1994-1995 by the
MLBPA. Since then, all of the six labor stoppages have been lockouts.
Bargaining Issues across All Four Sports
The same issues appear repeatedly within each of the sports and
across all four. The table below shows which issues arose in each sport
and how often. Some CBA negotiations involved multiple issues
whereas others focused on only one or two.
133. CHASS, supra note 61.
134. Id.
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TABLE 2
Labor Dispute Issue by Sport
League MLB NBA NFL NHL
Contract Length/Guarantee 0 1 1 1
Free Agency 5 1 3 2
Luxury Tax 0 1 0 2
Minimum Salary 0 0 3 0
Pension/Benefits 3 0 2 0
Reserve System 0 0 1 0
Revenue Sharing 1 1 2 4
Salary Arbitration 5 0 0 2
Salary Cap/Bonuses 2 3 2 4
The table below breaks down the labor issues buy decade. The
large increase in the 1990s is due to the fact that the first three de-
cades only include baseball and football. The 2000s are lower because
only hockey had a labor stoppage during that decade.
TABLE 3
Labor Dispute Issue by Decade
Issue 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 2010s
Contract Length/Guarantee 0 0 0 0 0 3
Free Agency 0 2 3 5 0 1
Luxury Tax 0 0 0 2 0 1
Minimum Salary 1 0 1 0 0 1
Pension/Benefits 1 2 2 0 0 0
Reserve System 0 1 0 0 0 0
Revenue Sharing 0 0 1 3 1 3
Salary Arbitration 0 1 2 4 0 0
Salary Cap/Bonuses 0 0 1 6 1 3
The salary cap is the most consistent issue across all four of the
leagues. Each sport has had the salary cap as one of its primary labor
issues in at least two CBA negotiations. Free agency and revenue
sharing are the only other issues that have come up in every sport.
Free agency has been an issue in 57.14% of the labor disputes and
salary caps have been involved in 52.38%, whereas revenue sharing
was involved in 38.1%.
What has changed over time is what issues are at the forefront. Free
agency and the salary cap, although common, did not appear as a la-
bor issue until the mid-1970's. The earliest appearance is of either of
these issues is in 1974, when the NFLPA challenged the Rozelle Rule,
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which involved a perpetual reserve system and thus, free agency was
virtually nonexistent. The MLBPA raised the free agency issue two
years later, although they had raised the reserve system as a labor
issue way back in 1968, but not pursued it as a major issue.
The salary cap is a much newer issue in professional sports. The
NFLPA again was the first union to raise this issue and was actually
the party suggesting the institution of a salary cap and 55% of league
revenues in 1982.135 Although the salary cap was an issue in the 1990
baseball dispute, it did not become a serious issue in any other sport
until the mid-1990's. The best explanation for this is the creation of
the NFL salary cap in 1992. Once one of the professional leagues had
received a salary cap from its union the other leagues began to push
for them as well. The salary cap was an issue in all four hockey and
three basketball labor stoppages and was a primary issue during the
1994-1995 baseball strike.136
Revenue sharing is a much newer issue, at least for some sports. It
first appeared in football disputes in 1982, baseball in 1990, hockey in
1992, and basketball in 2011. It was an issue in all of the last six labor
stoppages (all lockouts).
Due to the differences in league structures, for example, some have
luxury taxes and some do not, no one sport has had all of these issues
come up. Hockey and basketball have had much more limited reasons
for their labor stoppages. This appears to be a product of timing. Cer-
tain issues are more prevalent during certain periods of time. Since
the labor stoppages in basketball and hockey did not start until the
1990s it makes sense that their labor disputes would involved the is-
sues of that time, not issues of earlier times. Other issues, such as the
reserve system and pensions and benefits, become less relevant. This
is due to court cases that changed the systems and CBAs with terms
that both sides were able to deal with for an extended period of time.
The reverse is that many issues do not appear for decades. This
may be due to the disappearance of other issues. As issues get re-
solved - either by collective bargaining or by court cases, the owners
often looked for new ways maintain a system similar to the one they
lost. This involved creating new payment and control mechanisms,
which the players in turn challenged and endeavored to negotiate,
such as eliminating reserve systems, but then having salary caps and
free agency systems instead. The salary cap systems eventually led to
135. NFLPA WEBSITE, supra note 74.
136. DEVINE, supra note 9.
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the issues about revenue sharing since caps are often linked to shared
revenue.
The 1980s was clearly the transitional decade, with a wide variety of
issues coming up. This is interesting because it only involves two
sports - baseball and football. After the 1980s some issues were per-
manently resolved, became irrelevant or were absorbed into other
issues.
Interestingly, when basketball and hockey joined the fray in the
1990s, they did not start with the issues that baseball and football
started with, but picked-up where baseball and football were. This
could be due to these sports learning from observing the labor
problems in baseball and football. However, it is more likely an aspect
of the times. Certain issues are simply outdated. Basketball and
hockey were going to be dealing with the current sports labor issues of
the day, regardless of what they had or had not dealt with before.
This trend appears fairly consistent across professional sports. The
question remains whether this trend will hold true within each sport.
Bargaining Issues by Sport
Baseball
The following table shows baseball's labor issues by year of labor
stoppage.
TABLE 4
Baseball Issues by Labor Stoppage
League 1972 1973 1976 1980 1981 1985 1990 1994-95
Contract Length/
Guarantee 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Free Agency 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1
Luxury Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Minimum Salary 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Pension/Benefits 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Reserve System 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Revenue Sharing 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Salary Arbitration 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1
Salary Cap/
Bonuses 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1
There is very little issue resolution in baseball. Although grievance
arbitration has not been a primary issue since the 1960's, it has contin-
ued to be included and altered in every CBA. The reserve system was
resolved, although not ultimately through collective bargaining. In-
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stead federal legislation, the Curt Flood Act, placed limits on base-
ball's reserve system. 37 The minimum salary and luxury tax issues
have not been resolved so much as they have been absorbed into the
salary cap issue.
Most of the collective bargaining issues in baseball have not been
resolved. Pension and benefits issues arose repeatedly over a 16 year
period, free agency over 18 years and salary arbitration for over two
decades. Even the newer issue of revenue sharing lasted over a
decade.
This approach, repeating the same issues during each negotiation, is
generally unproductive. Each CBA becomes a temporary fix instead
of a long term solution. The risk of re-hashing the same issues is that
new issues may also be ignored because their importance is not fully
considered. All issues, new and old, carry with them other non-negoti-
ated but equally important issues. These are issues such as public im-
age, fan contentment and broadcasting deals.
The most recent example of this in baseball is drug testing. Al-
though drug testing had been discussed during several CBA negotia-
tions and some minor agreements had been made, neither side really
pushed the issue as an important one. When players began admitting
to steroid use and refusing to take tests, baseball was faced with a
public image problem that it had not anticipated and was unprepared
to deal with.
By failing to recognize the importance of one issue, the public im-
age of baseball was harmed and the fans began to question the legiti-
macy of the game and its results. The result was that both sides had to
scramble to appease the fans, the press and the government.
Furthermore, their failure to deal with the drug testing issue could
have had a very significant impact on the other professional sports.
Had the federal government passed a law requiring drug testing, it
would have covered all sports, not just baseball. The other sports,
some of which have governed themselves fairly well regarding drug
testing, were not pleased with the prospect of being regulated because
of the actions of another league.
Baseball does appear to have moved on from this cycle. The last
couple of CBAs have been negotiated without a labor stoppage, so
although the same issues some up, they are not severe enough to war-
rant either side declaring impasse. So whatever agreement was reach
in 1995 seems to have provided the long term solutions that have
evaded baseball negotiations for so long. Whether this will continue
137. 15 U.S.C. 26b (2005).
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remains to be seen, but by the time the current CBA expires, baseball
will have had 22 years of labor peace. The prosperity that is likely to
come with that will hopefully induce both sides to continue this trend.
Football
The following table shows football's labor issues by year of labor
stoppages.
TABLE 4
Football Issues by Labor Stoppage
League 1968 1974 1982 1987 2011
Contract Length/Guarantee 0 0 0 0 1
Free Agency 0 1 0 1 1
Luxury Tax 0 0 0 0 0
Minimum Salary 1 0 1 0 1
Pension/Benefits 1 0 1 0 0
Reserve System 0 1 0 0 0
Revenue Sharing 0 0 1 0 1
Salary Arbitration 0 0 0 0 0
Salary Cap/Bonuses 0 0 1 0 1
Football has a very different pattern from baseball. The NFL and
NFLPA appear to be better at creating long term solutions to their
differences. This does not mean that those issues are not renegotiated,
but that they cease to be the core issues that lead to a labor stoppage.
The reserve system was ultimately ended by a court decision and pen-
sion and benefit issues, although still relevant, have not been a central
issue in over three decades.
The lockout in 1982 resulted in more resolved issues then any CBA
negotiation before. The realization that the season could be lost
caused both sides to be more reasonable and agree to compromises
that they had previously refused. In 1982, many topics were proposed
that eventually became the basis of the CBA that the NFLPA and
NFL have had for over 20 years, albeit with many alterations in that
time.
In 1982 the union got most of the things that it wanted, just not at
the levels that it had originally asked for. This was a compromise of a
sort - it was not a trade, this-for-that, but it was the union lightening
their demands in return for the owners being willing to give them
something in all the areas. However, free agency still was not resolved
to either side's satisfaction.
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It was the decertification of the union in 1987 and the subsequent
CBA in 1992 that changed the pattern of collective bargaining in foot-
ball. The owners realized the value of being able to collectively bar-
gain with the players and the players learned the costs, particularly
financial, of going it alone on their contracts. After several years of
court battles the union was running out of money and the league was
losing most of the cases.138 Both sides were willing to compromise.
The resulting compromise was the most even trade in sports collec-
tive bargaining: a salary cap for free agency.
The 2011 lockout was the result of some of the same issues from
1982 and 1987. After several decades of simply making adjustments to
the CBA, there were finally enough large changes that the NFL de-
sired to warrant a more serious move. The NFLPA and NFL had been
able to deal with issues internally, without the need for a labor stop-
page, partially based on the personal relationship between NFL Com-
missioner Paul Tagliabue and NFLPA Executive Director Gene
Upshaw. 139 The current Commissioner, Roger Goodell, and Executive
Director, DeMaurice Smith, have no such history and this was the first
CBA negotiation for both of them, so that may have influenced how it
played out. Perhaps there would have been more labor stoppages had
not the relationship between Upshaw and Tagliabue existed.
Basketball
The following table shows basketball's labor issues by year of labor
stoppages.
TABLE 5
Basketball Issues by Labor Stoppage
League 1995 1998 2011
Contract Length/Guarantee 0 0 1
Free Agency 1 0 0
Luxury Tax 0 0 1
Minimum Salary 0 0 0
Pension/Benefits 0 0 0
Reserve System 0 0 0
Revenue Sharing 0 0 1
Salary Arbitration 0 0 0
Salary Cap/Bonuses 1 1 1
138. NFLPA WEBSITE, supra note 74.
139. Sridhar Pappu, Quarterback for a Team of 1,900, N.Y. Times, January 22,2011, located at
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/23/business/23nfl.html?adxnnl=1&adxnnlx=1296418040-/JKmB
kcFSVEc5etuXcHeaA& r=0
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Basketball has had a salary cap longer then the other three leagues.
The result of this is that the salary cap is a, if not the, primary labor
issue. The NBPA and NBA seem to have made a similar deal as the
NFL and NLFPA - a salary cap for free agency. The labor difference
between basketball and football is that in basketball the players' con-
tracts have been guaranteed. This is not the case in football.
The consequence of the guaranteed contracts is that although there
is a salary cap, the owners must pay players even if they are no longer
on the team. This affects how much money the owners have available
to pay the players actually playing on their team. This is why it is in
the owners' interest to lower the number of years a player must serve
before being eligible for free agency. It removes the owners' obliga-
tions earlier. If there were not guaranteed contracts, then the service
time necessary for free agency could be longer without having a real
detrimental effect on the owners' abilities to pay current players. It
also explains why the issue of contract length became a pertinent one
in 2011.
The other reason that the salary cap is a primary labor issue is that
it is a soft cap. Unlike a hard cap, such as the cap used in the NFL,
which limits athlete salaries to a percentage of league revenue, a soft
salary cap is more flexible. There have been numerous exceptions to
the soft salary cap, such as the Larry Bird Rule1 40 and different caps
based on the number of years a player has been in the league.141
There has been constant tweaking of the system and every change and
alteration has to be collectively bargained. The owners want a harder
cap and the players want a softer one, so every change becomes a
serious issue.
The tie-in between the salary cap and free agency is the primary
reason that these are the two issues that cause labor disputes in bas-
ketball. This has also lead to the rise of revenue sharing as an issue
because salary caps are generally tied to shared revenues. The repeat
issue of the salary cap, particularly the maximum is the catalyst for the
other issues involved. As long as a soft cap with a luxury tax system
remains, it seems unlikely that this trend will change in the future.
Hockey
The following table shows hockey's labor issues by year of labor
stoppages.
140. The Larry Bird Rule allows teams to exceed the salary cap to retain their own free
agents. This can reduce player movement by allowing teams to match or beat any offer
presented by another team.
141. CHASS, supra note 61.
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TABLE 6
Hockey Issues by Labor Stoppage
League 1992 1994 2004-05 2012-2013
Contract Length/Guarantee 0 0 0 1
Free Agency 1 1 0 0
Luxury Tax 1 1 0 0
Minimum Salary 0 0 0 0
Pension/Benefits 0 0 0 0
Reserve System 0 0 0 0
Revenue Sharing 1 1 1 1
Salary Arbitration 1 1 0 0
Salary Cap/Bonuses 1 1 1 1
Hockey has had a much wider range of bargaining issues, which is
reasonable given that there was no arms-length CBA prior to 1992. So
1992 is really the beginning of collective bargaining in hockey.
Over the two years from 1992 to 1994 that the CBA was being nego-
tiated many issues were resolved. The number of issues discussed was
due to the nature of the negotiations - everything was open for discus-
sion because the entire nature of hockey labor relations was changing.
The major sticking points were free agency and the salary cap. Reve-
nue sharing was an issue, but not as significant as it would become.
Ten years later financial issues were again the cause of a labor stop-
page. The owners were willing to cancel an entire season because they
claimed that many of the clubs were losing money. This may very well
have been true given that the NHL's television contracts had gone
down,142 and eventually were non-existent, and player salaries had
continued to go up. Owners wanted "cost certainty", i.e. a salary cap,
and the players did not feel that it was their responsibility to bail the
owners out of their spending problems.143
Although the attitudes on the part of both sides was reasonable, it is
another example of the union and owners failing to partner on what is
best for the overall welfare of the sport. The union did put forth some
effort to make the public aware that it was a lockout, not a strike, and
that the owners were responsible for the cancellation of the season,
they failed to get the public on their side. Instead the public sentiment
was against both - fans just wanted them to solve it and start playing
142. Jamie Fitzpatrick, NHL Cuts new Broadcast Deals with NBC and ESPN,
PROICEHOCKEY, May 21, 2004, located at http://proicehockey.about.com/od/nhinotebook/a/new
us tv deals.htm
143. Michael K. Ozanian, Ice Capades, FORBES, November 29, 2004, located at http://www.
forbes.com/home/free-forbes/2004/1129/124.html
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or admit that the NHL was dead. More significantly, a lot of sports
fans simply did not care.
The fan apathy at the cancellation of the 2004-2005 season seemed
to affect the players more then the owners and may have had some-
thing to with their eventual agreement to terms that they had previ-
ously rejected. Also, as many players stated, they just wanted to play
hockey. In the end the players showed more commitment to the good
of the game and the fans then the owners did, who were prepared to
cancel another season if necessary. The NHLPA ultimately helped the
public image of its members.
However, even after all of that the NHL and NHLPA still appeared
unable to work together on league-wide initiatives. The players com-
plained that the league's ad campaign did not feature any actual play-
ers but actors and that the league does not promote its athletes.144
This did not bode well for future cooperation between the league and
the union, and indeed another labor stoppage came to fruition.
Once the 2005 CBA expired, the same issues resulted in another
lockout, with the addition of contract length. This issue tied in with
the salary cap and revenue sharing issues as longer contracts make it
more difficult to remain under the cap and the cap amount is tied to
revenue sharing.
Given that the NHL and NHLPA are 4-for-4 in having labor stop-
pages when there is a CBA renegotiation, there is little reason to be-
lieve that this trend will change in the future. There is a parallel to the
early MLB/MLBPA relationship. Baseball had repeated labor stop-
pages over almost four decades, both during and after a period of time
when the players were at a significant disadvantage (the antitrust ex-
emption, the reserve clause, etc.). Hockey today is no different. The
NHLPA is only two decades removed from the fraudulent leadership
of Alan Eagleson. It took baseball almost twice that long to have
longer term dispute resolution and it is probable that hockey will re-
quire a similar amount of time.
CONCLUSION
So. . . Have Labor Stoppages been Effective?
As mentioned previously, if ending the labor stoppage is the goal of
the CBA negotiations is the measure of effectiveness, then all of the
labor stoppages have been effective, as there are currently no labor
stoppages in any of these sports, and will not be until 2016 at the earli-
144. Michael Farber, The NHL, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, November 21, 2005, located at http://
sportsillustrated.cnn.com/vault/article/magazine/MAG1113877/2/index.htm
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est, when the next CBA, baseball's, expires. However, with baseball's
new trend of renegotiating without a labor stoppage continues, than
we may not see a labor stoppage until the next decade. This indeed
seems like these disputes have been effective.
If, however, having long term resolution to the issues at the root of
the labor stoppages is the measure of effectiveness, then the results do
not look so rosy. Certain issues continue to re-appear, particularly the
salary cap, revenue sharing, and free agency. Every CBA creates new
structures and formulas for addressing these issues, but most of the
time those do not end up being satisfactory to both parties. Until solu-
tions for these issues can be devised that account for changing finan-
cial conditions, such as increased facility or personnel costs (not
players), it does seem that any of the compromises reached in an indi-
vidual CBA will be sustaining. And so the labor stoppages will likely
continue.
What Other Sports Unions Can Learn
There are several things that other sports unions, and the four dis-
cussed here, can learn from almost 40 years of sports collective
bargaining.
The first is money. Without a steady flow of revenue labor disputes
arise. When there is more money, everyone seems more willing to
compromise and disputes are more limited to who gets how much.
But both sides often seem less willing to go to the extreme of a labor
stoppage because that would damage the revenue streams both in that
year and in the future.
The second is the role of partnership outside of the collective bar-
gaining process. The relationship between Gene Upshaw and Paul
Tagliabue helped create almost two decades of labor peace in football.
In contrast, hockey players have felt that the NHL is not supportive of
them and their involvement with the league, even when they have a
CBA in place. Building those partnerships may help create an envi-
ronment where both sides are motivated to work with the other be-
cause, although they disagree, they both perceive the other as having
the best interest of the sport at heart.
The third is public image and fan attitudes. Both sides often fail to
understand the importance that public image can have. Both often
seem to believe that the fans will come back and generally that has
been true.
But it took baseball a decade to reach its pre-1994 attendance
figures and it has yet to regain the same type of national television
deal that it had. Hockey is selling out a lot of its games right now, but
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is on cable and suffering lackluster television ratings. Even the NBA
has seen declines in television ratings for its premiere games. Only the
NFL has managed to remain consistent in both its television ratings
and its attendance.
Newer, less established and popular sports may be unable to re-
cover from a labor stoppage and could very well collapse. The fan
belief that the players and owners value them and will not abandon
them is important and effects how a sport recovers after a work
stoppage.
The fourth and final lesson is: Do not rewrite the CBA every time.
CBAs are only a few years long and rewriting them after only that
short time is ineffective and tedious. It may take a system many years
to accomplish the goals that were intended. Often leagues and unions
seem unwilling to let this happen. They want instant fixes and when
they do not happen, they go back to drawing board.
If a system as been moving in the intended direction, then let it
continue. Make changes, address parts of the system that have been
ineffective and alter them, but to completely overhaul the system and
institute a new one results in set backs. The same issues arise repeat-
edly and new ideas fail to be solutions and become only band-aids.
As sports collective bargaining continues into the future, both sides
would be smart to listen to a very old adage that might get them to
cooperate and will win them public support: "It's not whether you win
or lose, but how you play the game."
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